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Abstract
The theory of intertemporal consumption choice makes sharp predictions about the evolution
of the entire distribution of household consumption, not just about its conditional mean. In
the paper, we study the empirical transition matrix of consumption using a panel drawn from
the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. We estimate the parameters that
minimize the distance between the empirical and the theoretical transition matrix of the con-
sumption distribution. The transition matrix generated by our estimates matches remarkably
well the empirical matrix, both in the aggregate and in samples stratified by education. Our
estimates strongly reject the consumption insurance model and suggest that households smooth
income shocks to a lesser extent than implied by the permanent income hypothesis. (JEL: D52,
D91, I30)
1. Introduction
How much consumption responds to income shocks is a central question in
macroeconomics. As is well known, this response depends on the particular model
that characterizes consumption behavior. For instance, the permanent income
hypothesis (PIH) implies that households set consumption equal to permanent
income, smoothing out transitory income fluctuations, but responding one-to-one
to permanent shocks. On the other hand, under perfect insurance markets the
distribution of marginal utilities is constant over time, and consumption does not
respond to idiosyncratic income shocks. Deaton and Paxson (1994) have stud-
ied the implications of these theories for the dynamics of consumption inequality.
They show that under the PIH or other models with incomplete markets, consump-
tion inequality within a group of households with fixed membership should, on
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average, increase with age. By contrast, the cross-sectional variance of marginal
utilities should be constant over time under perfect insurance markets. The dynam-
ics of consumption inequality is therefore informative about the impact of income
shocks and about the validity of models of consumption behavior.1
Our point of departure from this literature is that measures of consumption
inequality do not always provide an accurate measure of household behavior.
Consumption inequality is a static concept, and as such it cannot handle violations
of the life cycle–permanent income hypothesis (such as borrowing constraints or
myopic behavior), which would imply a role for transitory income fluctuations
over and above permanent fluctuations, or buffer stock behavior, which would
imply more smoothing of income shocks than predicted by the standard model.
The handling of these issues, we argue, calls for an analysis of consumption
mobility.
The distinction between consumption inequality and consumption mobility
is, effectively, a distinction between static and dynamic features of a distribution.
Inequality refers to the dispersion of consumption at a point in time. Mobility
describes movements within the consumption distribution as time goes by. Stud-
ies of consumption inequality may record no change in the dispersion of the
underlying distribution even in the presence of intradistributional movements,
with direct implications for welfare analysis.2 Despite the importance of these
issues, to the best of our knowledge the present paper represents the first attempt
to analyze consumption mobility, both theoretically and empirically.3 As we shall
see, the analysis of consumption mobility delivers new implications of various
theoretical models of intertemporal choice, generates new empirical tests and
insights of those models, and allows estimation of the impact of income shocks
on consumption.
The paper attempts to understand which model of intertemporal consumption
choice is capable of explaining the amount of consumption mobility we observe
in the data. We focus on several consumption theories, among which the theory
of consumption insurance, the rule-of-thumb model, and the PIH model have
1. Cutler and Katz (1992) provide descriptive analysis of consumption inequality. More recently,
motivated by the increase in income inequality in the U.S., a strand of papers has analyzed patterns
of consumption inequality. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2003), for example, explore the
implications of the recent sharp rise in U.S. wage inequality for welfare and the cross-sectional
distributions of hours worked, consumption, and earnings.
2. In contrast to the analysis of consumption, there is a long tradition of studies of earnings and
income mobility. Existing contributions can be divided into two broad groups. A first group analyzes
transition probabilities across quantiles of the earnings distribution by Markov-chain models (e.g.,
Shorrocks 1978). A second approach is to specify and estimate a process for the conditional mean
of earnings (e.g., Lillard and Willis 1978).
3. Phelan (1994) constructs transition matrices for consumption and leisure for the purpose of
characterizing the properties of constrained-efficient allocations in dynamic economies with private
information. Krueger and Perri (2003) estimate the persistence of consumption using the second
largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix of consumption. They do not consider the implications of
their theoretical models for consumption mobility.
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received the widest attention. We nest these popular consumption models and
estimate the parameters that minimize the distance between the empirical and
the theoretical transition matrix of the consumption distribution. The exercise is
performed constructing a transition matrix for consumption and testing different
hypotheses concerning consumption dynamics. Because to measure mobility one
needs to follow households over time, the empirical analysis is conducted on a
panel drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth
for the years 1987 to 1995. The survey we use is representative of the Italian
population, contains a measure of total nondurable consumption, and has good-
quality income data. Because there are virtually no panel data sets with broad
consumption measures, a by-product of this paper is to bring the data set to the
attention of empirical macroeconomists.
To see how the theory of intertemporal choice delivers implications for con-
sumption mobility, consider first the extreme case of full consumption insurance.
According to this theory, the cross-sectional distribution of the marginal utility of
consumption of any group of households is constant over time. Of course aggre-
gate consumption can increase or decrease, so the growth of the marginal utility
for any household can be positive or negative, but the relative position of each
household in the cross-sectional distribution of marginal utilities does not change
over time. Consumption insurance therefore makes strong predictions about the
entire distribution of marginal utilities, not just its mean or variance. In particular,
consumption insurance implies absence of mobility of the marginal utility of con-
sumption between any two time periods, regardless of the nature of the individual
income shocks and the time frame considered. If one observes people moving
up and down in the distribution of marginal utilities one must therefore conclude
that some people are not insulated from idiosyncratic shocks, a contradiction of
the consumption insurance hypothesis.4
A second case we consider is the rule-of-thumb model which predicts that
households simply set consumption equal to income in each period. Given that
any change in current income translates into an equivalent change in consumption,
one should expect a relatively high degree of consumption mobility if shocks are
not correlated with the rank position in the initial distribution of consumption.
In more realistic models with incomplete markets and insurance opportuni-
ties, individuals use saving as a self-insurance device and are able to smooth away
at least some of the income variability. In these models the extent of consump-
tion smoothing depends, among other things, on market imperfections arising
from informational or enforceability problems and on the presence of liquid-
ity constraints. Within this class of models, the best known is the PIH, in which
income shifts over time because of transitory (e.g., mean reverting) and permanent
4. Although this implication of consumption insurance was mentioned in a theoretical paper by
Banerjee and Newman (1991), to our knowledge it has never been explored empirically.
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(e.g., persistent or nonmean reverting) shocks. If people behave according to the
PIH, consumption reacts mostly to permanent unanticipated income shocks but
is almost insensitive to transitory ones. Households will therefore move up and
down in the consumption distribution only in response to permanent shocks. Thus,
in the absence of taste shocks or measurement error, one should expect a degree
of mobility that is intermediate between the level predicted by the consumption
insurance hypothesis and the rule-of-thumb model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
the empirical transition matrix of the marginal utility, measured with log con-
sumption per capita. The empirical matrix turns out to be quite robust to various
adjustments and controls for the effect of family size and labor supply on pref-
erences. In Section 3 we review the implications for consumption dynamics of
the theories of intertemporal consumption choice and consider how to account
for measurement error in consumption and taste shocks in the utility function.
In Section 4 we estimate the parameters of the consumption rule by minimiz-
ing the distance between the empirical and the simulated transition matrix of the
consumption distribution. The results, presented in Section 5, reject statistically
each of the simple representations of the consumption decision rule, and reveal
that households smooth income shocks to a lesser extent than implied by the
PIH. The estimated parameters are also able to reproduce remarkably well the
difference in consumption mobility that we observe in samples stratified accord-
ing to education. The results are robust to the presence of measurement error
in income and remain unchanged if we estimate simultaneously the parameters
of the income process and of the consumption rule. Section 6 summarizes our
results.
2. Measuring Consumption Mobility
The first step of our analysis is to construct an empirical transition matrix of con-
sumption. This requires longitudinal household data. For this purpose we use the
1987–1995 panel of the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
This data set contains measures of consumption, income, and demographic char-
acteristics of households. The SHIW provides a measure of total nondurable
consumption, not just food, thus overcoming one of the main limitations of other
panels, such as the PSID, that have been used to test for intertemporal consumption
choice.
The SHIW, conducted by the Bank of Italy, surveys a representative sample
of the Italian resident population. Sampling is in two stages, first municipali-
ties and then households. Municipalities are divided into 51 strata defined by
17 regions and 3 classes of population size (more than 40,000; 20,000 to 40,000;
less than 20,000). Households are randomly selected from registry office records.
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From 1987 through 1995 the survey was conducted every other year and covered
about 8,000 households, defined as groups of individuals related by blood,
marriage, or adoption and sharing the same dwelling. Starting in 1989, each
SHIW has re-interviewed some households from the previous surveys. The panel
component has increased over time: 15% of the sample was re-interviewed in
1989, 27% in 1991, 43% in 1993, and 45% in 1995.5 The response rate (ratio
of responses to contacted households net of ineligible units) was 25% in 1989,
54% in 1991, 71% in 1993, and 78% in 1995.6 Although these figures uncover
considerable sample attrition especially in the early years of the survey, they are
comparable to those obtained in other microeconomic data sets. For instance,
in 1994 the net response rate in the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey was
83% for the interview sample and 81% for the diary sample. Given the rotat-
ing sample structure, the number of repeated observations on households in
our sample ranges from a minimum of two to a maximum of five. Ample
details on sampling, response rates, processing of results, and comparison of
survey data with macroeconomic data are provided by Brandolini and Cannari
(1994).
The total number of consumption transitions—that is, observations for the
same household that are repeated over two adjacent years of data—is 10,508. To
minimize measurement error we exclude cases in which the head changes over
the sample period or gives inconsistent age figures. In most cases, the excluded
households are those facing breaking-out events (widowhood, divorce, separa-
tion, etc.), leading to changes in household head. Inconsistent age figures can
reflect unrecorded change in household head or measurement error. After these
exclusions, the sample has 9,214 consumption and income transitions. Con-
sumption is the sum of all expenditure categories except durables. Income is
defined as the sum of labor income and transfers of all household members,
excluding income from assets. These are the standard consumption and income
concepts used in studies that test the implications of the permanent income
hypothesis.7
Table 1 reports sample statistics of log consumption, income, and other
household characteristics. All statistics are computed using sample weights. The
panel is relatively stable over the sample period. Consumption grows consid-
erably between 1987 and 1989 and is roughly constant afterwards. Over time,
5. In the panel component, the sampling procedure is also determined in two stages: (i) selec-
tion of municipalities (among those sampled in the previous survey); (ii) selection of households
reinterviewed. This implies that there is a fixed component in the panel (for instance, households
interviewed five times between 1987 to 1995, or four times from 1991 to 1995) and a new component
every survey (for instance, households re-interviewed only in 1989).
6. Response rates increase in 1991 because in that year households included in the panel were
chosen among those that had previously expressed their willingness to being re-interviewed.
7. Adding back asset income or asset income net of imputed rents does not change the main results
of the paper.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 All years
In ct 9.90 10.08 10.02 10.01 10.00 10.02
var (ln ct ) 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28
Gini coefficient of ct 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28
In yt 10.25 10.40 10.36 10.27 10.27 10.32
var (ln yt ) 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.57 0.47 0.45
Gini coefficient of yt 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.34
South 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.37
North 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.46
Family size 3.15 3.12 3.04 3.07 3.01 3.07
Self-employed 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16
Years of schooling 7.38 7.97 8.19 8.03 8.10 8.03
Less well-educated 0.78 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.72
More educated 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.28
Age 52.00 52.52 52.78 53.05 55.03 53.22
Born ≤ 1940 0.60 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.53
Born > 1940 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.47
Income recipients 1.63 1.72 1.72 1.74 1.78 1.73
Number of observations 1,097 2,717 4,036 4,006 3,211 15,067
Note: Cross-sectional means and variances are computed using sample weights. The variables ct and yt denote house-
hold nondurable consumption and disposable income, respectively. Demographic characteristics refer to the household
head.
family size declines while the number of income recipients increases. Other
demographic characteristics remain roughly unchanged. Self-employment falls
slightly over time. Income strongly declines in 1993, a recession year, while
dispersion increases. In all years, household disposable income is more variable
than consumption. Note also the stability of the cross-sectional variance of log
consumption as opposed to the wide fluctuations in the cross-sectional variance
of log income. The pattern of the Gini coefficients for consumption and income
confirms that the income distribution is less equal than the consumption distribu-
tion (34% vs. 28%). Interestingly, the 1993 recession boosts income inequality
while leaving consumption inequality unaffected. These descriptive statistics are
consistent with models in which households are able to smooth away at least some
of the income shocks.
The focus of the present analysis, however, is not consumption inequality
but consumption mobility. In what follows, we focus on the transition matrix of
the logarithm of nondurable per capita consumption (log(c)). We also check the
sensitivity of the results using different consumption equivalent scales and the
interactions between consumption and labor supply (see subsequent discussion).
Note that the transition matrix estimated for log(c) is identical to that estimated
for c−γ , where γ is a constant. Thus, if individual utility is isoelastic (u(c) =
(1 − γ )−1c1−γ ), and in the absence of taste shocks and measurement error in
consumption, the empirical transition matrix of log consumption can also be
interpreted as the empirical transition matrix of marginal utilities, a convenient
feature in the light of our empirical strategy below.
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2.1. The Empirical Transition Matrix
Assume that P is an unobservable q ×q stochastic transition matrix of log house-
hold consumption, q being the number of consumption classes in the distribution.
These classes could be determined exogenously or estimated from the quantiles
of the empirical distribution. For notational simplicity we consider transition
probabilities from period t to period t + 1; extending the argument to transition
probabilities in periods t + 2, t + 3, and so on, is straightforward. The generic
element of P is pij , the probability of moving from class i in period t to class
j in period t + 1 conditioning on being in class i in period t. Define nij as the
number of households that move from class i in period t to class j in period
t + 1, ni = ∑qi=1nij as the total number of observations in each row i of P, and
n = ∑qi=1ni the total number of observations. The maximum likelihood estima-
tor of the first-order Markov transition probabilities is pˆij = nij /ni (Anderson
and Goodman 1957).8
Table 2 reports the transition matrix of log per capita consumption from
1987–1989 to 1993–1995. Recall that the SHIW is conducted every 2 years,
so we observe transitions from period t − 2 to period t. The elements of the
main diagonal report the proportion of households that did not change quartile.
For instance, the entry in the top left cell of the 1993–1995 panel indicates that
68% of the households in the first quartile in 1993 were still in that quartile
2 years later. Off-diagonal elements signal consumption mobility. For instance,
the second entry in the first row indicates that 25% of households moved from the
first quartile in 1993 to the second quartile in 1995. The transition matrices for
other years are similar, displaying substantial amount of consumption mobility.9
Each of the transition matrices is based on the distribution of log per capita
consumption and does not take into account the fact that household expenditures
might be affected by demographic variables and labor supply choice, breaking
the link between the dynamics of log consumption and that of the marginal utility
of consumption.
Changes in family size, for instance the arrival of children, alter family
needs, hence, consumption allocations. Similarly, if household expenditures are
8. There are two methods for constructing the empirical counterpart of P. One is to keep the width
of the consumption interval constant and let the number of observations within each interval vary.
The alternative, more standard method, is to keep constant the marginal probabilities and let the
interval width change, for instance dividing the distribution into discrete quantiles. We proceed
using quartiles throughout; results with deciles are qualitatively similar and are not reported, for
brevity.
9. In the simulation analysis we will make the assumption that consumption mobility is generated
by a symmetric distribution of income shocks, which implies that our simulated transition matrix
is also symmetric. It is therefore of interest to check if the transition matrix is symmetric using the
maximum likelihood test suggested by Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland (1975). The statistic is of the
form  = ∑i>j (pij − pji)2/(pij + pij ) ∼ χ2q(q−1)/2. The p-value of the test is close to 1 for all
years and does not reject the null hypothesis of symmetry.
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Table 2. The transition matrix of consumption.
1987–1989
1989 Quartile
1987 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.71 0.20 0.07 0.02
2nd 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.08
3rd 0.08 0.29 0.40 0.23
4th 0.03 0.09 0.29 0.60
1989–1991
1991 Quartile
1989 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.66 0.25 0.07 0.01
2nd 0.25 0.41 0.27 0.06
3rd 0.10 0.27 0.41 0.25
4th 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.68
1991–1993
1993 Quartile
1991 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.63 0.26 0.08 0.02
2nd 0.23 0.38 0.29 0.09
3rd 0.11 0.28 0.37 0.25
4th 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.60
1993–1995
1995 Quartile
1993 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.67 0.25 0.07 0.01
2nd 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.07
3rd 0.07 0.27 0.43 0.23
4th 0.02 0.05 0.23 0.69
Note: The table reports consumption transitions from period t − 2 to period t . The generic element of this table is p̂ij ,
the estimated probability of moving from quartile i in period t − 2 to quartile j in period t . Define nij as the number of
households that move from quartile i in period t − 2 to quartile j in period t and ni = ∑i nij as the total number of
observations in each row i of the transition matrix. The maximum likelihood estimator of the first-order Markov transition
probabilities is then p̂ij = nij /ni .
characterized by economies of scale, one would observe mobility in consump-
tion per capita even if the distribution of consumption per adult equivalent is
constant over time. We thus compute transitions using log consumption per adult
equivalent rather than per capita.10 The pattern of the transition matrix and of the
10. There is a large literature on the cost of children and on the economies of scale in consumption,
see Deaton (1997) for a survey. Any particular choice of an equivalence scale is therefore to a certain
extent arbitrary, depending on the estimation method and assumptions about the utility function. We
rely on a plausible equivalence scale that is consistent with current literature, assigning a weight of
1 to the first adult, 0.8 to any additional adult, and 0.25 to each household member less than 18 years
old. We obtain similar results changing the parameters of the equivalence scale within a range of
realistic estimates (0.1 to 0.5 for children, 0.6 to 1 for adults).
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associated mobility index is unaffected. As a further check, we restrict attention to
households whose demographic structure did not change over the sample period
and find, again, similar consumption transitions.11 In the remainder of the paper
we thus focus on log consumption per capita.
If leisure is an argument of the utility function, and if consumption and leisure
are nonseparable, consumption decisions are affected by predictable changes in
households’ labor supply (Attanasio 2000). This implies that the dynamics of
consumers’ rank in the consumption distribution depends, among other things,
on changes in hours of work. Failure to control for changes in labor supply
might therefore induce consumption mobility even in the absence of income
and other idiosyncratic shocks. The interaction between consumption and labor
supply is unlikely to affect the transition matrix of log consumption, however.
First of all, in our sample, hours worked by individual household members and
the proportion of spouses working do not change appreciably over the period
considered. Second, even if we exclude households reporting changes in labor
force participation (which induce the most dramatic shifts in labor supply), the
consumption transition matrix is almost identical to the full sample matrix. For
instance, when we apply this restriction, the main diagonal elements of the 1993–
1995 transition matrix are 0.67, 0.42, 0.43, 0.69 (instead of 0.67, 0.43, 0.43,
0.69). These robustness checks suggest that in our sample the transition matrix of
marginal utilities is not affected by demographic changes or by the labor supply
status of the household.
2.2. Inference
The transition matrices in Table 2 are informative about the amount of consump-
tion mobility—or the mobility of marginal utility—that we observe in the data. In
the next section we derive from theory the implications for consumption mobility
of popular models of intertemporal choice (PIH, rule-of-thumb, and consump-
tion insurance), nest the models in a convenient unifying framework, and confront
them with the data. Then, in Section 4 we discriminate among these models by
estimating the parameters that minimize the distance between the empirical and
the theoretical transition matrix of the consumption distribution.
To make inference about the empirical transition matrix, we will rely on the
modifiedχ2 goodness-of-fit statistic proposed by Anderson and Goodman (1957):
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
ni
(pˆij − p0ij )2
pˆij
∼ χ2q(q−1). (1)
11. For instance, excluding households with changes in family composition results in a mobility
index of 0.576 in 1993–1995.
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The statistic compares estimated and theoretical transition probabilities and can
be used to test the null hypothesis that pij = p0ij for all i, j. A similar statis-
tic can be used to test if the transition matrix differs statistically over time or
between population groups:
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
Ni
(
pˆ
g0
ij − pˆg1ij
)2
pˆij
∼ χ2q(q−1),
where pˆij is the estimate of pij obtained pooling data for two groups or time
periods g0 and g1, and N−1i = (1/ng0i ) + (1/ng1i ).
In the empirical application we will also be interested in matching the empiri-
cal transition matrix with a simulated matrix that depends on a vector of unknown
parameters θ . This estimation problem can be addressed by implementing a
minimum χ2 method, namely, minimizing the function
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
ni
(
pˆij − pij (θ)
)2
pij (θ)
. (2)
The properties of this estimator are discussed in Neyman (1949). In
Appendix B we show that (2) can be rewritten as
(pˆ − p(θ)) (θ)−1(pˆ − p(θ))′, (3)
where—after deleting a column from the theoretical and empirical transition
matrices to avoid singularity—pˆ is the vector of estimated transition probabilities,
p(θ) the vector of theoretical transition probabilities, and (θ) the covariance
matrix of the distance vector (pˆ − p(θ)). The function (3) has therefore the optimal
minimum distance form of Chamberlain (1984) that econometricians are familiar
with.12
Neyman (1949) also proposed a modified minimum χ2 method, where the
function to minimize is
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
ni
(pˆij − pij (θ))2
pˆij
.
Appendix B proves that this function can be rewritten as (pˆ − p(θ)) ˆ−1(pˆ−
p(θ))′, where ˆ uses the estimated pˆij to construct an estimate of the covariance
matrix of (pˆ − p(θ)).
12. Note that when dim(pˆ) > dim(θ), the minimized value of (3) can also be interpreted as the
statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions. The statistic is distributed χ2dim(pˆ)−dim(θ).
“zwu001060309” — 2006/1/24 — page 85 — #11
Jappelli and Pistaferri Intertemporal Choice and Consumption Mobility 85
When the expression for pij (θ) is available in closed form, implementation
of the minimum χ2 criterion is straightforward. When it is not, as in our case,
one must rely on simulations to generate the transition probability conditional on
θ , and then apply the minimum χ2 method to the simulated pij (θ). Details are
provided in Section 4 and in Appendix A.
3. Intertemporal Choice and Mobility
To explore the relation between the consumption and the income distributions,
it is useful to start by presenting a fairly general characterization of the income
process. Starting with Hall and Mishkin (1982), it has become quite standard in
panel data studies of income and consumption dynamics to express log income
of household h in period t as
ln yh,t = βXh,t + ph,t + eh,t , (4)
where Xh,t is a set of deterministic variables such as age and region of residence,
and ph,t and eh,t are permanent and transitory components, respectively.13 The
latter is the sum of an idiosyncratic (εh,t ) and an aggregate component (εt ); both
are assumed to be serially uncorrelated. Because the permanent component of
income changes very slowly, the standard assumption is to model it as a random
walk process of the form
ph,t = ph,t−1 + zh,t , (5)
where zh,t is the permanent innovation, which is again the sum of an idiosyncratic
(ζh,t ) and an aggregate shock (ζt ); both components are serially uncorrelated. We
also assume that εh,t and ζh,t are mutually uncorrelated disturbances with vari-
ances σ 2ε and σ 2ζ , respectively. Because we operate with a short panel, transitory
and permanent aggregate shocks will be estimated by a vector of time dummies,dt .
The decomposition of income shocks into transitory and permanent compo-
nents dates back to Friedman (1957). Some of the income shocks are transitory
(mean reverting) and their effect does not last long. Examples include fluctua-
tions in overtime labor supply, bonuses, lottery prizes, and bequests. On the other
hand, some of the innovations to earnings are highly persistent (nonmean revert-
ing) and their effect cumulates over time. Examples of permanent innovations
are generally associated with job mobility, promotions, layoffs, and severe health
shocks.
Given our assumptions, income growth can be written as

 ln yh,t = 
dt + β
Xh,t + ζh,t + 
εh,t . (6)
13. The logarithmic transformation eliminates heteroskedasticity in the distribution of income in
levels.
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As we shall see, this income process delivers different implications for con-
sumption mobility for different models of intertemporal choice. We also consider
how these implications change in the presence of taste shocks, measurement error
in consumption, and measurement error in income.
3.1. The Permanent Income Hypothesis
The first model we consider is a version of the PIH with CRRA preferencesu(c) =
(1 − γ )−1c1−γ , where γ−1 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We
assume that infinitely lived households maximize expected utility under perfect
credit markets, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. We assume that
income follows the process (4)–(5) and that it is the only source of uncertainty of
the model. As in Blundell and Preston (1998) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2003), we approximate the Euler equation for consumption with a second-order
Taylor expansion and assume that r = δ, that consumption equals permanent
income, and that the conditional variance of income shocks varies only in the
aggregate. One can show that under such assumptions, individual consumption
growth depends on an aggregate component mPIHt and unanticipated idiosyncratic
income shocks:

 ln ch,t = mPIHt +
r
1 + r εh,t + ζh,t . (7)
Equation (7) indicates that the optimal rule is to respond one-to-one to perma-
nent shocks ζ and to revise consumption only by the annuity value of the income
innovation in case of transitory shocks ε. This is in fact the basic insight of the
PIH, where people self-insure against high-frequency income shocks but adjust
their consumption fully in response to low-frequency shocks. As we shall see, a
convenient feature of equation (7) is that it can easily be nested with consumption
rules derived from different models.
Suppose now that we observe a given cross-sectional distribution of consump-
tion at time t − 1 and that the income shocks are not perfectly correlated with
the consumption rank of each household in the cross-section. Because aggre-
gate shocks are by definition identical for all households, they do not change
each consumer’s rank in the consumption distribution and therefore they will
not induce any consumption mobility: If they were the sole source of consump-
tion fluctuations the mobility index would be zero.14 However, other shocks are
idiosyncratic, and will move people up and down in the consumption distribu-
tion, to an extent that depends on the variance of the two shocks. But because the
14. Suppose that income shocks were instead perfectly and positively correlated with the rank
of household consumption in the cross-section. Then, the poorest households receive the largest
negative shocks and the richest the largest positive shocks, implying no mobility as in the consumption
insurance case.
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impact of transitory shocks is scaled down by the factor r/(1 + r), we expect the
variance of the permanent shocks to have the greatest impact on mobility.
Simulation results produced by Carroll (2001) show that with constant rela-
tive risk aversion, impatient consumers, and an income process similar to the one
we use, the implication of the PIH that transitory income shocks have a negligi-
ble impact on consumption still holds true. Permanent shocks, however, have a
somewhat lower impact in buffer stock models. In fact, in such models permanent
income shocks reduce the ratio of wealth to permanent income, thus increasing
also precautionary saving. Under a wide range of parameter values, Carroll shows
that in this class of models the marginal propensity to consume of a permanent
income shock is about 0.9, not far from that of the approximation in (7). There-
fore, empirically it is difficult to distinguish the PIH from buffer stock models
on the basis of the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income
shocks. But the main intuition is still valid: If individuals smooth consumption
and understand the income generating process, transitory income shocks should
have a negligible impact on consumption. To account for the effect remarked by
Carroll and others, in the empirical analysis we take into account the degree of
consumption smoothing arising from precautionary savings estimating:

 ln ch,t = mPIHt + φ
(
r
1 + r εh,t + ζh,t
)
.
In buffer stock models (φ < 1), assets accumulated for precautionary pur-
poses allow people to smooth income shocks to a larger extent than in the PIH
model (φ = 1).
3.2. The Rule-of-Thumb Model
Let us assume that consumption equals income in each period, that is,
ln ch,t = ln yh,t .
This model has been often proposed as a simple, yet extreme alternative
to the PIH to describe the behavior of households that do not use savings to
buffer income shocks but spend all they receive. Some authors rationalize this
model by appealing to the presence of binding liquidity constraints in each period.
Laibson (1997) shows that it is the equilibrium outcome for hyperbolic (or golden-
eggs) consumers.15 We term it rule-of-thumb model to indicate a situation in
15. In the hyperbolic consumer model, individuals have preferences that change over time (there
are different selves in different periods). In the model proposed by Laibson (1997) self t −1 chooses
assets at−1 to constrain the consumption of self t. This is done by keeping most assets invested in
an illiquid instrument. Hence, at any point in time, the consumer is effectively liquidity constrained,
even though the constraint is self-imposed. Laibson shows that in equilibrium consumption is exactly
equal to the current level of cash flow, or total income.
“zwu001060309” — 2006/1/24 — page 88 — #14
88 Journal of the European Economic Association
which consumption tracks income closely, even when individuals have accu-
mulated assets in previous periods. The model is an interesting case to study
because it approximates the behavior of consumers with short horizons, limited
resources, or hyperbolic discount factors, giving an upper bound for the sensitivity
of consumption to income shocks.
Using the income process (4)–(5), the dynamic of consumption is given by

 ln ch,t = mKt + εh,t − εh,t−1 + ζh,t , (8)
where mKt is the effect of the aggregate shocks on consumption in the rule-of-
thumb model. According to the model, the growth rate of consumption is therefore
equally affected by current and lagged transitory shocks and by permanent shocks.
The main difference with the PIH is that in the rule-of-thumb model, transitory
shocks impact one-to-one on consumption. It is precisely for this reason that in the
rule-of-thumb model one should expect more consumption mobility than under
the permanent income rule: There is another channel through which households
move to a different quartile from one period to the next.
3.3. Consumption Insurance
To illustrate the implications of the theory of intertemporal choice with complete
insurance markets, let us keep the assumption that households have preferences of
the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type. The implications of the model are
identical for any power utility function. As shown, among others, by Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Greene (1995), the optimal transition law for consumption with
complete markets can be obtained by assuming that there is a social planner who
maximizes a weighted sum of individual households’ utilities. The Lagrangian
of this problem can be written as
L =
∑
h
λh
∑
s
∑
t
πs,tu
(
ch,s,t
)+∑
s
∑
t
µs,t
(
Cs,t −
∑
h
ch,s,t
)
,
where h, s, and t are subscripts for household h in the state of nature s in period t,
λh is the social weight for household h,µs,t is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the resource constraint, πs,t the probability of the realization of state s in
period t, and Cs,t aggregate consumption in state s and period t.
The first-order condition can be written in logarithms as
−γ ln ch,s,t = ln µs,t − ln λh − ln πs,t .
To obtain the growth rate of consumption, subtract side-by-side from the same
expression at time t − 1:

 ln ch,t = −γ−1
 ln µt + γ−1
 ln πt ≡ mCIt , (9)
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where we drop the subscript s because only one state is realized in each period.
The two terms on the right-hand side of equation (9) represent genuine aggregate
effects. The first term is the growth rate of the Lagrange multiplier, the second is
the growth rate of the state probabilities. Note that first-differencing has eliminated
all household fixed effects (µ and π in equation 9 are not indexed by h).
Equation (9) states that the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption
(or of consumption, for that matter) of each household is the same. This implies
that the initial cross-sectional distribution of consumption is a sufficient statistic
to describe all future distributions. Because all households experience the same
growth rate of marginal utility, and given our assumption of isoelastic utility,
their rank in the consumption distribution is stationary. Note that the stationarity
of the cross-sectional distribution is directly implied by the assumption that insur-
ance markets fully insulate households from idiosyncratic shocks. The statistical
counterpart of consumption insurance is that the transition matrix for household
consumption is an identity matrix. The extreme assumptions of this model are
clearly unrealistic. However, the model provides a lower bound for the impact of
income shocks on consumption and is therefore a useful theoretical benchmark.
The discussion in Sections 3.1–3.3 suggests that under CRRA preferences
(and no measurement error or taste shocks), consumption mobility should be
zero in the consumption insurance model, intermediate in the permanent income
model, and highest in the rule-of-thumb model. In practice, the presence of mea-
surement error and/or taste shocks does not provide a clear-cut ordering of the
models in terms of expected mobility. Nevertheless, it is still possible to distin-
guish between the different models by estimating the parameters that determine
the extent of consumption mobility that we observe in the data.
3.4. Nesting the Three Models
The distinction between the three models is useful but too stylized for empirical
applications. Consumption insurance is no less unrealistic than assuming that all
income is consumed in each period, or that all households follow exactly the PIH.
In the empirical application we therefore nest the three models and estimate the
parameters of the following flexible consumption rule:
ln ch,t = ln ch,t−1 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t − λεh,t−1 + ζh,t
)
. (10)
Because aggregate shocks do not affect consumption mobility under each
of the models discussed above, for notational simplicity equation (10) omits the
aggregate component mjt . However, when we estimate the income process we
control for aggregate shocks by introducing time dummies in the regression (dt
in equation (6)).
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The two parameters λ and φ allow us to distinguish various forms of depar-
ture from the stylized models of intertemporal choice. Consider first the case
in which φ = 1. The parameter λ represents the extent to which consumption
responds to income over and above the amount warranted by the PIH—that is,
the excess sensitivity of consumption to current and past income shocks. One
way to interpret this parameter is that each household sets consumption equal
to income with probability λ (perhaps because of binding liquidity constraints
or hyperbolic discounting) and follows the PIH with probability (1 − λ). Note
that with λ = 0 the expression (15) reduces to the PIH, while with λ = 1
one obtains the rule-of-thumb model where consumption equals income each
period.
Consider now the situation in which φ = 0. Income shocks play no role in the
consumption insurance model. But intermediate cases in which 0 < φ < 1 are
interesting and potentially informative, as discussed in Section 3.1. Some con-
sumers have assets accumulated for precautionary reasons which allow them
to smooth income shocks to a larger extent than in the PIH model (where
φ = 1).
3.5. Measurement Error and Taste Shocks
The consumption transition law is derived assuming that there is no measure-
ment error in consumption. In practice, consumption mobility, as estimated from
the data, is potentially upward-biased because of reporting errors. If respondents
report their consumption with errors, one will find units moving up and down even
if their true rank in the consumption distribution is unchanged; hence, measure-
ment errors affect consumption dynamics and the extent of mobility we measure
in the data. In the estimation it is therefore important to account explicitly for mea-
surement error. We will do so by assuming that true consumption is measured
with a multiplicative error:
ln c∗h,t = ln ch,t + ω˜h,t , (11)
where ln c∗ is measured consumption and ω˜ is an independently and identically
distributed measurement error.
As explained in Section 2, another source of consumption mobility is taste
shocks. Even though in Section 2 the actual empirical matrix is quite stable across
a wide range of robustness checks (such as defining consumption in terms of adult
equivalents, or restricing the sample to minimize the potential impact of leisure on
consumption transitions), the impact of unobserved taste shocks cannot be ruled
out. To see what impact they have on the empirical estimates, we rewrite the
utility function as u(c, ξ) = (1 − γ )−1c1−γ exp(θ ξ˜ ), where ξ˜ is an i.i.d. shock
to individual preferences.
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The combined presence of measurement error and taste shocks leads to the
following reformulation of the consumption dynamics in equation (10):
ln c∗h,t = ln c∗h,t−1 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t − λεh,t−1 + ζh,t
)
+ (ω˜h,t − ω˜h,t−1)+ ψ(ξ˜h,t − ξ˜h,t−1), (12)
where ψ is a function of θ , γ , and λ.
Without loss of generality, assume that in each period the standard deviation
of measurement error (σω˜) is a fraction ηω˜ of the standard deviation of measured
consumption, σω˜ = ηω˜σln c∗ and that the standard deviation of taste shocks (σξ˜ ) is
a fraction ηξ˜ of the standard deviation of measured consumption, σξ˜ = ηξ˜ σln c∗.
Because the variables are expressed in logs, ηω˜ and ηξ˜ can be interpreted as the
percentage variability in observed consumption due to reporting error and taste
shocks, respectively. Rewrite (12) as
ln c∗h,t = ln c∗h,t−1 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t − λεh,t−1 + ζh,t
)
+ ηω˜
(
ωh,t − ωh,t−1
)+ ψηξ˜ (ξh,t − ξh,t−1), (13)
where we have adopted the linear transformations ωh,τ = η−1ω˜ ω˜h,τ and ξh,τ =
η−1
ξ˜
ξ˜h,τ , so that ω ∼ i.i.d.(0, σln c∗) and ξ ∼ i.i.d.(0, σln c∗). It is clear from (13)
that, in the absence of additional information, the separate effects of taste shocks
and measurement error are not identified. We thus can define a composite error
term υ˜h,t = ηω˜ωh,t + ψηξ˜ ξh,t , and rewrite (13) as
ln c∗h,t = ln c∗h,t−1 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t − λεh,t−1 + ζh,t
)
+ α(υh,t − υh,t−1), (14)
where we have adopted the linear transformation υh,τ = α−1υ˜h,τ , so that
υ ∼ i.i.d.(0, σln c∗) and α =
(
η2
ω˜
+ (ψηξ˜ )2
)1/2 is an unknown parameter to esti-
mate. Equation (14) shows that the composite error term induces a further reason
for consumption to vary. Clearly, not only consumption dynamics changes, but
the implied consumption mobility as well.16 In what follows, we will therefore
interpret the parameter α as the amount of consumption variability induced by
measurement error and taste shocks.
16. The clearest case in which this happens is in the model with consumption insurance (where
φ = 0) and no taste shocks: Measurement error can induce consumption mobility even though the
growth rate of marginal utilities is constant.
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4. Estimation Method
We now discuss estimation of the parameters of interest. One complication with
the panel we use is that although income and consumption refer to calendar years,
data are collected every other year from 1987 to 1995. The simulated transition
laws for consumption must therefore be slightly modified to tackle this problem.
One can use the recursive aspect of (14) to rewrite it as
ln c∗h,t = ln c∗h,t−2 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t +
(1 − λ)r
1 + r εh,t−1 − λεh,t−2 + ζh,t + ζh,t−1
)
+ α(υh,t − υh,t−2). (15)
The parameters to be estimated are the variances of the permanent and tran-
sitory income shocks, the fraction of measurement error and taste shocks, the
degree of excess sensitivity, the degree of income smoothing, and the real interest
rate. As for the interest rate, we assume a value of 2% throughout.
The estimation of the income and consumption process can be performed
in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the income variances σ 2ε and σ 2ζ . In
the second step we use the estimated income variances to generate the income
shocks ε and ζ and the composite error υ that appear in the consumption rule and
estimate the parameters φ, λ, and α by simulated minimum χ2 method.
As explained in Section 4, we specify the income process as
ln yh,t = dt + βXh,t + ph,t + εh,t ,
whereyh,t is per capita household disposable income and dt a set of time dummies.
Using the 1987–1995 panel, we regress ln yh,t on a set of demographic variables
(north, south, a dummy for gender, a fourth-order age polynomial, and education
dummies) and time dummies, so as to remove the deterministic component of
income. We save the residuals uh,t = ph,t + εh,t and carefully examine their
covariance properties. We estimate covariances using equally weighted minimum
distance methods, as suggested by Altonji and Segal (1997).17
We find that the estimated covariances are consistent with the income process
in equations (4) and (5), namely, that there is a random-walk permanent compo-
nent and a serially uncorrelated transitory shock. Recall that because of the sample
design of the SHIW we can only construct the covariance matrix for two years
apart income residuals, uh,t − uh,t−2 = ζh,t + ζh,t−1 + εh,t − εh,t−2. To check
the consistency of the estimated income process with the model in equations (4)
17. Covariances can be estimated by equally weighted minimum distance or optimal minimum
distance. As shown by Altonji and Segal (1996), the latter can produce inconsistent estimates in
small samples, so we adopt the former.
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and (5), note that the income process implies the following testable restrictions
on the covariance matrix of the first difference of the income residuals:
E
[(
uh,τ − uh,τ−2
)2] = 2σ 2ζ + 2σ 2ε
E
[(
uh,τ − uh,τ−2
)(
uh,τ−2 − uh,τ−4
)] = −σ 2ε
E
[(
uh,τ − uh,τ−2
)(
uh,τ−j − uh,τ−j−2
)] = 0 for all j ≥ 4.
Provided that the restrictions are met in the data, one can estimate the variance
of the transitory shock σ 2ε from the first-order autocovariance of income residuals
and the variance of the permanent shockσ 2ζ combining information on the variance
and the first-order autocovariance of the residuals. We find that the estimated
autocovariance at the second order is very small (−0.0056) and not statistically
different from zero (a t-statistic of −1.1); the autocovariance at the third order
is again small (−0.0178) and not statistically different from zero (a t-statistic
of −1.1). In contrast, the first-order autocovariance (which provides an estimate
of −σ 2ε ) is precisely estimated (a t-statistic of 6.4) at −0.0794. The estimate
of the overall variance (2σ 2ζ + 2σ 2ε ) is 0.2122 (with a t-statistic of 19.4), so
we infer that σ 2ζ = 0.0267 and σ 2ε = 0.0794 (with standard errors 0.0135 and
0.0123, respectively).18 These parameter estimates are broadly consistent with
the evidence available for the U.S. where researchers have found variances of
similar magnitude.19
The remaining unknown parameters are φ, the degree to which consumers are
unable to insure income shocks through precautionary savings, λ, the degree of
excess sensitivity of consumption, and α, the composite amount of consumption
variability induced by measurement error and taste shocks. We therefore estimate
φ, λ, and α minimizing the distance between the empirical and the theoretical
transition matrix using the modified χ2 criterion presented in Section 2.
Because theoretical transition probabilities do not have a closed form expres-
sion, we use a simulated minimum χ2 estimation method.20 A sketch of the
estimation method is the following. We start by generating, for each household,
draws for the transitory and the permanent income shocks and for the measurement
error in consumption.21 The income shocks are drawn from a normal distribution
18. Unfortunately, with data collected every 2 years we cannot distinguish between this income
process and one where the transitory component is an MA(1) process.
19. For instance, Carroll and Samwick (1997), using the PSID, estimate σ 2ζ = 0.0217 and σ 2ε =
0.0440.
20. Alan and Browning (2003) estimate the parameters of the Euler equation (the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution and the amount of measurement error) using simulated Euler equation
residuals. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the
intertemporal discount rate using a method of simulated moments conditional on the assumption
that the PIH is the true consumption model.
21. In each year we choose a sample size identical to the number of actual sample transitions (for
instance, 2,982 in 1991–1993 and 3,211 in 1993–1995).
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with mean zero and variances equal to the estimated variance from the income
process (σ 2ε = 0.0794 and σ 2ζ = 0.0267, respectively). The errors υh,t and
υh,t−2 are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal
to the variance of measured log consumption at t and t − 2, respectively. The
number of draws is S = 100 for each household, for a total of HS simulated
observations (H being the number of households). We then choose a starting
value for the parameter vector and, for each household, compute next period
consumption, ln c∗h,t , using (15). In this way, the covariance structure between
individual income and individual consumption bears directly on the extent of
consumption mobility. Finally, we compute the theoretical transition probabili-
ties (averaging across the S simulations) and obtain the parameter estimates as
those that minimize the (optimal) distance between empirical and theoretical
transition probabilities. Because the number of transition probabilities that we fit
exceeds the number of parameters we estimate, we have overidentifying infor-
mation that can be used to assess the goodness of fit of the model. Appendix A
reports technical details about the properties of this estimator and the minimization
algorithm.
The two-step procedure described in this Section provides consistent, but not
fully efficient, parameter estimates. In Section 5.4 we therefore check the sensi-
tivity of the results estimating simultaneously income and consumption mobility,
as well as the rank correlation statistics between the two variables.
5. Estimation Results
In this section we report full sample estimates of the parameters of the con-
sumption rule and of the transition matrix for consumption. We also check the
sensitivity of the estimates if we estimate simultaneously the parameters of the
income process and of the consumption rule and when we consider measurement
error in income. Finally, we split the sample by educational attainment of the head,
estimate a separate income process for each education group, and evaluate pat-
terns of consumption mobility of households with different levels of educational
attainment.
5.1. Full Sample Estimates
The results of the full sample estimates are similar across periods, so we focus
on the most recent one (1993–1995), which also features the largest number of
transitions. The stability of the results across different sample periods suggests
that the simulations are only marginally affected by the initial distribution of
consumption (the income process and the associated variances of the shocks are
in fact assumed to be the same across the different samples).
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As a preliminary analysis, we constrain the parameter space in the simulated
minimum χ2 estimation method and compare the empirical and theoretical
transition matrices in three benchmark models: PIH (φ = 1, λ = 0), rule-of-
thumb (φ = 1, λ = 1), and consumption insurance (φ = 0). In these experiments,
we also rule out the effect of measurement error and taste shocks by setting α = 0.
These benchmark models illustrate our estimation strategy and provide a gateway
to the results that follow.
We find that simulated consumption mobility, as measured by the Shorrocks
mobility index, is highest in the rule-of-thumb model (65%), intermediate in the
case of the permanent income hypothesis (44%), and zero under consumption
insurance.22 The ranking of mobility agrees with the discussion in Section 3.3
because idiosyncratic income shocks translate into consumption changes entirely
in the rule-of-thumb model, partially in the PIH via intertemporal smoothing, and
are fully insured in the risk sharing model. However, from a statistical point of
view, none of these models is able to match the amount of empirical mobility. Cell-
by-cell comparison of the theoretical and empirical transition matrices reveals
that each of the three models is rejected according to the χ2 goodness-of-fit
statistics.23
To bridge the gap between simulated and empirical mobility we therefore con-
sider the effect of measurement error and taste shocks in consumption, and allow
for a more flexible response of consumption to income shocks than predicted by
either full insurance, rule-of-thumb model, or PIH. We know from equation (15),
nesting the three baseline models, that raising the excess sensitivity parameter λ
or the insurance parameter φ also increases consumption mobility, regardless of
the size of the composite error term.
We therefore implement the simulated minimum χ2 estimation method free-
ing the parameter space. The parameter estimates of φ, λ, and α are reported
in column (1) of Table 3. For completeness, we also report the estimates of σ 2ζ
and σ 2ε obtained in the first step. Because the restriction φ = 1 is not rejected
statistically, we impose the restriction in column (2). The results indicate that the
composite variability of consumption due to measurement error and taste shocks
is 38% and that the excess sensitivity coefficient is 16%. Both estimates are pre-
cisely estimated and statistically different from zero at the 1% level. For values of
φ = 1, λ = 0.16 and α = 0.38, the simulated mobility index is almost identical
to the empirical one (60.13% vs. 59.37%). The χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic (or
test of overidentifying restrictions) is 15 with a p-value of 9%, indicating that the
22. The Shorrocks index, defined as S(P) = (q − 1)−1(q − trace(P)), is a standard way of sum-
marizing the extent of mobility from a transition matrix. See Shorrocks (1978).
23. In the rule-of-thumb case (α = 0, λ = φ = 1), the χ2 value is 58, in the PIH (α = λ = 0,
φ = 1) 250, and in the consumption insurance case (α = λ = φ = 0) 2,856. Each of these values
exceeds the critical value of χ212;0.05 = 21.
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and χ2 statistics.
(1) (2)
φ 0.9875 1.0000
(0.0230)
λ 0.1586 0.1622
(0.0377) (0.0248)
α 0.3875 0.3822
(0.0186) (0.0116)
Variance of permanent shocks (σ 2ζ ) 0.0267
(0.0135)
Variance of transitory shocks (σ 2ε ) 0.0794(0.0123)
χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic 15.21 15.22
[0.0853] [0.1241]
Note: The table reports simulated minimum χ2 estimates of the parameters φ, λ,
andα (asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis) and theχ2 goodness-of-fit statistic
(p-value of the test in square brackets). In column (2) we imposes the (acceptable)
restriction that φ = 1. The estimates of σ 2ζ and σ 2ε are obtained in a first step by
imposing restrictions on the autocovariances of income growth (see Section 4).
model fits well the transition probabilities: We cannot reject the hypothesis that
the empirical transition probabilities are jointly equal to the simulated ones.24
The simulation predicts almost perfectly the empirical transition matrix cell-
by-cell, not just the aggregate mobility index. In Table 4 we report the simulated
transition probabilities and (in parenthesis) the empirical transition probabilities,
the same reported for 1993–1995 in Table 2. The comparison between the two sets
Table 4. Simulated and empirical transition matrix of consumption.
1995 Quartile
1993 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.6748 0.2515 0.0677 0.0061
(0.6700) (0.2528) (0.0660) (0.0112)
2nd 0.2513 0.4111 0.2748 0.0628
(0.2416) (0.4259) (0.2665) (0.0660)
3rd 0.0675 0.2764 0.4175 0.2386
(0.0660) (0.2653) (0.4346) (0.2341)
4th 0.0061 0.0613 0.2401 0.6926
(0.0237) (0.0549) (0.2332) (0.6883)
Note: The table reports the simulated consumption transitions between 1993 and 1995 and, in parenthesis, the empirical
consumption transitions. The simulated transitions probabilities are obtained from the estimates reported in column (2)
of Table 3.
24. Results for other years are similar with the exception of 1991–1993. In that period actual mobil-
ity increases substantially, a fact that is not captured by our simulations. One possible explanation is
that the variance of the permanent shock, which is assumed to be time stationary, changed in 1993
due to the unprecedented strong recession. However, we cannot rule out that in 1993 the amount of
measurement error is greater than in the other 2 years. Another possibility is that the 1993 reces-
sion impacted unevenly on households, a particular form of nonstationarity that we neglect in our
simulation exercise.
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of numbers is striking: Regardless of cell, the difference between the empirical
and simulated values is at most 2 percentage points.
The estimated value of the excess sensitivity parameter (λ = 0.16) is broadly
consistent with previous evidence on the effect of transitory income shocks on
consumption expenditure. Using CEX quarterly panel data, Souleles (1999) and
Parker (1999) examine, respectively, the response of household consumption to
income tax refunds and to predictable changes in Social Security withholdings.
Souleles finds evidence that the marginal propensity to consume is at least 35%
of refunds within a quarter, and Parker that consumption reacts significantly to
changes in tax rates. In both studies, the impact of transitory income shocks is
too high to be consistent with the PIH model, but in the range of estimates pro-
duced by our hybrid model. Browning and Crossley (2001) survey several other
studies reporting evidence that consumption overreacts to anticipated income
innovations.
Our estimates allow us to characterize consumption mobility both in the short
and in the long run by using recursively the transition law for consumption and
the realizations of the income shocks (equation (15)). To illustrate, let us consider
an individual who is in the bottom consumption quartile in the initial period. With
full consumption insurance, absent measurement error and taste shocks, there is
no mobility across quartiles: The individual rank in the consumption distribution
is forever unchanged. Figure 1 shows that in a world in which households change
consumption one-for-one in response to permanent income shocks, and smooth
transitory shocks by saving and dissaving (the PIH model, obtained by setting
φ = 1, α = 0, and λ = 0 in equation (16)), there is instead a 24% probability
of leaving the bottom consumption quartile in period t + 2 conditional on being
in the bottom quartile in period t. Because in each period the household receives
new income shocks, we can generate a consumption distribution also for years
Figure 1. The probability of leaving the first quartile of the consumption distribution.
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t + 4, t + 6, and so on until t + 20 (recall that our panel and transition law
for consumption span 2 years of data). From each distribution we then create
consumption quartiles and compute the probability of moving to higher quartiles
in period t+4, t+6, and so on conditional on being in the first quartile in period t.
This set of calculations traces the lowest line in Figure 1. Because the income
process is nonstationary, income shocks compound and the chance of leaving the
bottom quartile increases over time, up to a long-run value of 43%.
A second source of consumption mobility is the sensitivity of consumption
to transitory income shocks. The intermediate line in Figure 1 is obtained using
a transition law for consumption with φ = 1, λ = 0.16, and α = 0. Although
the line lies above the one estimated for the PIH, the distance between the two is
rather small, reflecting a small estimate for λ. Measurement error and taste shocks
represent a third source of consumption mobility. The upper line in Figure 1 plots
the estimated probability of moving from the lowest quartile for the full model
(φ = 1, λ = 0.16, and α = 0.38, as in Table 3). The distance between this line
and the intermediate line (with α = 0) indicates that this composite term adds
about 10 percentage points to the probability of leaving the bottom consumption
quartile. Notice also that the probability in t+2 is 33%, matching the actual value
(0.33 = 1 − p11 in Table 5) and that measurement error impacts equally short-
and long-run mobility.
5.2. Simultaneous Estimation of Consumption and Income Mobility
So far, we have followed the two-step estimation strategy described in Section 4.
The first step uses covariance restrictions of the dynamic income process to
estimate σ 2ζ and σ 2ε , the variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. In
the second step we estimate the parameters of the consumption rule, conditional
Table 5. Parameter estimates and χ2 statistics.
φ 0.9776
(0.0551)
λ 0.1542
(0.0735)
α 0.3960
(0.0192)
Variance of permanent shock (σ 2ζ ) 0.0246
(0.0039)
Variance of transitory shock (σ 2ε ) 0.0501(0.0055)
χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic 97.81
[<0.0001]
Note: The table reports simulated minimum χ2 estimates of the parameters
φ, λ, α, σ 2ζ , and σ 2ε (asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis), and the χ2
goodness-of-fit statistic (p-value of the test in square brackets).
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on the estimates of σ 2ζ and σ 2ε obtained in the first step. Under our maintained
assumptions this procedure is consistent but not fully efficient. For example, we
do not use information of the income transition matrix—which may be interesting
in its own right—or information on the joint behavior of consumption and income
growth, if not through the dynamic consumption rule embedded in (15).
Here we extend our procedure and estimate the parameters of the income and
consumption process simultaneously. We consider the restrictions that the theory
imposes on the consumption transition matrix, the income transition matrix, and
the Spearman joint rank correlation of income and consumption growth.25 The
estimation method is an extension of the one described in Appendix A, and it is
detailed in Appendix C.
Table 5 reports the results of this exercise. The estimated variance of per-
manent income shocks, σ 2ζ , is similar to the one estimated with the two-step
procedure; the variance of transitory shocks, σ 2ε , is slightly smaller (0.050 vs.
0.079) and more precisely estimated. The parameters of the consumption process
φ, λ, and α are remarkably close to those reported in Table 3 and therefore yield
a similar interpretation.
The goodness-of-fit statistics increases (there are now 20 degrees of free-
dom, instead of 9), which signals that the model could be improved. This can be
seen from Table 6, where we report consumption and income transition proba-
bilities, as well as the Spearman joint rank correlation index, predicted by our
estimation strategy. The figures in parenthesis are the corresponding statistics
computed from the actual data. Our model fits quite well the Spearman joint
rank correlation, which is 0.42. As before, we are also able to fit consumption
transition probabilities remarkably well given our estimated parameters. In con-
trast, the fit of the income transition matrix is not as good. For example, the
theoretical model suggests that the probability of remaining in the third quartile
of the income distribution should be 41%. In practice, in the data there is more
persistence (48%). We leave investigations of the reasons for these discrepan-
cies to future research, and in the remainder of the paper focus on the two-step
procedure.
25. The Spearman index of the joint rank correlation between two variables x and y is defined as
R =
∑n
i=1 r(xi)r(yi) − n
(
n+1
2
)2√[∑n
i=1 r(xi)2 − n
(
n+1
2
)2] [∑n
i=1 r(yi)2 − n
(
n+1
2
)2]
where r (·) is the rank and n the sample size.
The Spearman joint rank correlation index is distribution-free and is not affected by influential
values. In terms of our competing theories, and in the absence of measurement error and taste shocks,
a full consumption insurance model would suggest an index close to zero; a rule-of-thumb model
would suggest an index close to 1. A hybrid model suggests values between these two extremes.
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Table 6. Simulated and empirical transition matrices of consumption and income.
Panel (A): Consumption
1995 Quartile
1993 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.6764 0.2502 0.0677 0.0056
(0.6700) (0.2528) (0.0660) (0.0112)
2nd 0.2506 0.4132 0.2739 0.0623
(0.2416) (0.4259) (0.2665) (0.0660)
3rd 0.0667 0.2752 0.4184 0.2398
(0.0660) (0.2653) (0.4346) (0.2341)
4th 0.0059 0.0617 0.2401 0.6923
(0.0237) (0.0549) (0.2332) (0.6883)
Panel (B): Income
1995 Quartile
1993 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.6793 0.2460 0.0678 0.0068
(0.6588) (0.2204) (0.0872) (0.0336)
2nd 0.2436 0.4091 0.2766 0.0707
(0.2503) (0.4496) (0.2204) (0.0797)
3rd 0.0696 0.2785 0.4081 0.2438
(0.0560) (0.2565) (0.4832) (0.2042)
4th 0.0070 0.0667 0.2475 0.6787
(0.0349) (0.0736) (0.2095) (0.6820)
Panel (C): Joint rank correlation
0.4225
(0.4216)
Note: Panel (A) of the table reports the simulated consumption transitions between 1993 and 1995 and, in parenthesis, the
empirical consumption transitions. Panel (B) repeats for income. Panel (C) contains the Spearman joint rank correlation
of consumption and income growth.
5.3. Measurement Error in Income
In this section we consider the robustness of our conclusions in the presence
of measurement error in income. This error inflates the variance of the tran-
sitory shock but does not affect the variance of the permanent shock. To see
this point, assume that true income is measured with a multiplicative error:
lny∗h,t = lnyh,t + νh,t , where νh,t is an independently and identically normally
distributed measurement error with mean zero and variance σ 2ν . Using the income
process (4)–(5):
ln y∗h,t = βXh,t + ph,t + εh,t + νh,t ,
the 2-years-apart income residual is now
uh,t − uh,t−2 = ζh,t + ζh,t−1 + εh,t − εh,t−2 + νh,t − νh,t−2.
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The covariance matrix of the first difference of the income residuals depends now
on the variance of the measurement error:
E[(uh,τ − uh,τ−2)2] = 2σ 2ζ + 2σ 2ε + 2σ 2ν
E[(uh,τ − uh,τ−2)(uh,τ−2 − uh,τ−4)] = −σ 2ε − σ 2ν
E[(uh,τ − uh,τ−2)(uh,τ−j − uh,τ−j−2)] = 0 for all j ≥ 4.
However, it can be checked that measurement error inflates the estimated
variance of the transitory shock by σ 2ν , but not the variance of the permanent
shock σ 2ζ , which is still identified by the difference between the variance and
(minus twice) the first-order autocovariance. The conclusion is that even though
the estimate of the variance of the permanent shock is unaffected by serially
uncorrelated measurement error, the estimate of the variance of the transitory
shock is not.
This implies that in the model with full consumption insurance, idiosyncratic
income shocks play no role regardless of measurement error in income. In the
permanent income model, the impact of measurement error in income is bound
to be small, because transitory shocks play a very limited role. In contrast, mea-
surement error may have a large impact in the rule-of-thumb model. Because
we cannot identify σ 2v from the data, we repeat our simulation: (a) dropping the
self-employed from the sample on which we estimate the income process26 and
(b) downsizing the variance of the transitory shock, that is, assuming that one-
third or one-half of the estimated first-order autocovariance reflects measurement
error. The results of these experiments are very similar to the simulations reported
in Tables 3 and 4 and are not reported for brevity.
5.4. Group Estimates
Except for the extreme case of consumption insurance, models with incomplete
insurance suggest that if different population groups are systematically exposed
to different idiosyncratic shocks (and therefore face different income processes),
consumption mobility should differ across groups in a predictable way.27 There-
fore, comparison of different population groups with different income-generating
processes is potentially quite interesting. Indeed, even more compelling evidence
for the ability of our simulations to explain consumption transitions comes from
comparing consumption mobility in two education groups: compulsory schooling
or less and high school or college degree.
26. Brandolini and Cannari (1994) note that in the SHIW income from self-employment is less
well estimated than wages or salaries.
27. Attanasio and Davis (1996) also exploit predictable differences between education groups to
provide insights about the consumption insurance hypothesis.
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Focus on education is warranted for at least three reasons: (1) education is
an exogenous characteristic by which one can partition the sample; (2) there is
wide evidence that different education groups face different earnings opportuni-
ties and uncertainties; and (3) education is likely to be correlated with variables
affecting preferences and therefore with different consumption behavior. We run
the income regressions separately for households headed by individuals with high
and low education. We then estimate the autocovariance matrix as explained in
Section 4, and find σ 2ζ = 0.0296 and σ 2ε = 0.0754 for the less well-educated,
and σ 2ζ = 0.0198 and σ 2ε = 0.0895 for those with at least a high school degree.
The estimated variances signal that the less well-educated face a higher variance
of permanent income shocks, a pattern also uncovered by Carrol and Samwick
(1997) with U.S. data. Because in our sample the income process varies consid-
erably by education groups, we have an ideal setting to test the validity of models
of intertemporal choice and of the robustness of our procedure.
The transition probabilities reported in the two lower panels of Table 7
indicate also that consumption mobility differs between the two groups in a sys-
tematic way. Applying the test on difference of transition probabilities outlined
in Section 2, we reject the hypothesis that the two matrices are equal at the 1%
significance level.
Quite clearly, the consumption insurance model is unable to explain dif-
ferences in consumption mobility emerging from income shocks, transitory or
permanent. In that model all shocks are insured, and provided measurement error
or taste shocks are the same in both groups, consumption mobility between two
groups exposed to different shocks should be identical. Therefore, the fact that
mobility is higher in the group with lower education provides further evidence
against the consumption insurance model.28 For quite different reasons, the rule-
of-thumb model with λ = 1 (or any model where excess sensitivity to transitory
income shocks plays a prominent role) predicts little or no difference between
education groups. In the simulations the lower variance of the transitory shock
for the less well-educated is offset by a higher variance of the permanent shock,
resulting in approximately the same mobility rates in the two groups.
We therefore estimate equation (15) and the associated consumption transi-
tions allowing for differential response between the two education groups. The
parameter estimates of the simulated minimum χ2 method and the associated χ2
statistic are reported in Table 7. Also in this case, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that φ = 1 in each of the two groups. We find a value of α = 0.38 (s.e. 0.01) and
λ = 0.4 (0.05) in the group with low education and α = 0.28 (0.01) and λ = 0.09
(0.05) in the group with high school or college degree. The model replicates quite
28. The different estimates of α in the two groups will generate some differences in estimated
mobility. However, unlike the estimates of λ, the α estimates are fairly similar in the two groups,
and so this is unlikely to be a relevant explanation.
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Table 7. Simulated and empirical mobility for different education groups.
Panel(A) Summary statistics
Low education High education
Variance of permanent shock (σ 2ζ ) 0.0296 0.0198
(0.0115) (0.0347)
Variance of transitory shock (σ 2ε ) 0.0754 0.0895(0.0097) (0.0329)
λ 0.3991 0.0889
(0.0459) (0.0470)
α 0.3814 0.2846
(0.0120) (0.0125)
χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic 23.03 20.85
[0.0106] [0.0222]
χ2 test of parameter equality 55.85
[7.4e–013]
Panel(B): Probabilities Low education
1995 Quartile
1993 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.6432 0.2610 0.0845 0.0113
(0.6449) (0.2633) (0.0830) (0.0088)
2nd 0.2413 0.3863 0.2848 0.0877
(0.2240) (0.4208) (0.2532) (0.1020)
3rd 0.0733 0.2654 0.3913 0.2700
(0.0780) (0.2524) (0.4421) (0.2277)
4th 0.0099 0.0770 0.2498 0.6632
(0.0327) (0.0750) (0.2500) (0.6423)
Panel(C): Probabilities High education
1995 Quartile
1993 Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1st 0.7037 0.2485 0.0457 0.0022
(0.7016) (0.2258) (0.0605) (0.0121)
2nd 0.2472 0.4463 0.2686 0.0379
(0.2308) (0.4656) (0.2389) (0.0648)
3rd 0.0464 0.2681 0.4661 0.2194
(0.0242) (0.2460) (0.4839) (0.2460)
4th 0.0015 0.0373 0.2156 0.7456
(0.0163) (0.0569) (0.2398) (0.6870)
Note: The first panel reports summary statistics for two education groups: the variance of the income shocks, the estimates
of α and λ (asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis), the associated χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic (p-value of the test in
square brackets), and the χ2 statistic of the test that the parameters of the two education groups are the same (p-value
in square brackets). The education groups are defined as compulsory schooling or less, and high school or college. The
other two panels report the simulated transition probabilities and (in parenthesis) the empirical transition probabilities for
the two education groups.
well also the difference in empirical and simulated mobility between the two
groups: The simulated mobility index (0.64 and 0.55 for low and high educa-
tion, respectively) is quite close to empirical mobility in each group. And in
each of the two cases the χ2 statistic does not reject the null hypothesis that the
“zwu001060309” — 2006/1/24 — page 104 — #30
104 Journal of the European Economic Association
simulated probabilities are equal to the empirical ones at the 1% significance
level.
As a final check of the validity of the estimates, we test whether the parameters
are the same in the two groups. Call θ˜h and θ˜l the k × 1 vectors of simulated
minimum χ2 estimates of θ for high- and low-educated individuals. Given the
asymptotic normal distribution of the estimator and the fact that the two samples
are independent, the null hypothesis of no group difference can be tested using
the statistic
(θ˜h − θ˜l)′(var(θ˜h) + var(θ˜l))−1(θ˜h − θ˜l),
which is distributed χ2k under the null. The test statistic, reported in the last row
of the first panel of Table 7, rejects the null hypothesis of parameter equality. The
other two panels of Table 7 report the simulated transition probabilities and (in
parenthesis) the empirical transition probabilities for the two education groups.
Once more, each of the simulated probabilities is remarkably close to the empirical
transitions regardless of the group considered.
From an economic point of view, the result that the less-well-educated indi-
viduals are more responsive to transitory income shocks than the high-income
group is of particular interest. To the extent that these households are less likely
to have access to credit and insurance markets than households with higher edu-
cation, our findings support the hypothesis that excess sensitivity stems from the
effect of borrowing constraints, rather than from other sources.29 We also find
that the estimate of α is higher for the less well-educated. Whether this reflects a
tendency to report noisier consumption data or a greater incidence of taste shocks
in this group is, however, an issue that cannot be settled here.
5.5. Relation with Previous Tests
It is useful to contrast our approach with previous tests of models of intertemporal
choice. First of all, our simulation method produces estimates of the propensity
to consume out of transitory and permanent income shocks. These parameters
are of great policy interest, for instance to evaluate the effect of a tax cut or other
changes in the household budget constraint. Excess sensitivity of consumption has
sometimes been inferred from the income growth coefficient in Euler equations
estimates. However, there is much disagreement concerning the interpretation
of the excess sensitivity parameter due to various identification problems in the
estimation of the Euler equation (Attanasio 2000). Whereas the Euler equation
29. Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) report evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances
that individuals with less than a college degree are more likely to be turned down for loans, to have
no credit card, or to have no line of credit. The same households have also fewer assets relative
to income, an indicator that has often been interpreted as bearing on the incidence of borrowing
constraints.
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literature is concerned with estimation of preference parameters derived from
the first-order conditions of the consumers’ optimization problem, we attempt at
estimating the parameters of the consumption rule. This does not come without
costs, however. We make specific assumptions about preferences and the income
generating process, and our estimates are therefore conditional on the validity of
the theoretical framework and on the stability of the income process. This paper is
therefore part of a growing literature in macroeconomics that attempts to estimate
structural (or semistructural) models by means of simulated estimation methods.
Second, and for quite different reasons, our approach to test for consump-
tion insurance differs from previous tests based on regression analysis. Cochrane
(1991), Mace (1991), Townsend (1994), Attanasio and Davis (1996), and Zhang
and Ogaki (2001) regress household consumption growth on aggregate variables
and idiosyncratic shocks (such as change in disposable income, unemploy-
ment hours, and days of illness). The implication of the theory is that none of
these shocks should impact household consumption growth, as in equation (9).
Focussing instead on the relation between consumption insurance and consump-
tion mobility has two advantages: (1) we do not need to identify explicitely any
of these shocks, and (2) we don’t need to assume that they are uncorrelated with
unobservable or omitted preference shocks, including household fixed effects.
Moreover, measurement error in the shock variables biases tests based on regres-
sion analysis towards the null hypothesis of full consumption insurance; our
testing strategy is instead robust to such problem. Of course, as we have clarified,
our approach requires us to make specific (and untestable) assumptions on how
taste shocks impact the marginal utility of consumption.
Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Attanasio and Jappelli (2001) test another
implication of the theory of consumption insurance, namely, that the cross-
sectional variance of consumption is constant over time. However, the distribution
of consumption at time t might have the same variance of the distribution at time
t − 1 even if there is mobility in the underlying distributions.30 Tests based on
the dynamics of the cross-sectional variance of consumption are therefore biased
towards the null. Our test instead still signals rejection of the consumption insur-
ance model even in situations in which the cross-sectional variance is constant
over time but there is mobility in the underlying distribution.
6. Summary
The implications of the theories of intertemporal consumption choice for con-
sumption mobility are as yet unexplored. In this paper we study transition
30. For instance, suppose that a poor and a rich household switch ranks in the consumption distri-
bution. This will not change the cross-sectional variance of consumption but represents a violation
of consumption insurance.
“zwu001060309” — 2006/1/24 — page 106 — #32
106 Journal of the European Economic Association
probabilities for total nondurable consumption using the 1987–1995 panel con-
tained in the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. The panel
data allow us to calculate an empirical transition matrix of log per capita consump-
tion. The matrix shows that there is substantial consumption mobility: In any year,
about 60% of the households moves up or down in the consumption distribution.
In the remainder of the paper we attempt to understand which model of
intertemporal consumption choice is capable of explaining the amount of con-
sumption mobility we observe in the data. From the theoretical point of view, the
consumption insurance model provides the clearest implications for consumption
mobility. In a model where all idiosyncratic income shocks are insured, the initial
cross-sectional distribution of consumption is a sufficient statistic for all future
distributions, and therefore, apart from measurement error in consumption and
taste shocks, the model predicts zero consumption mobility. On the other hand,
the rule-of-thumb model is one where income shocks have the greatest impact on
consumption; it therefore generates substantial consumption mobility. Finally, in
models with optimizing agents and incomplete markets (such as the permanent
income model or models with precautionary saving) households react mainly to
permanent income shocks. Thus, the degree of mobility predicted by the model
is intermediate between the two other models.
We carefully parametrize an income process to distinguish between transitory
and permanent shocks and use the estimated parameters to simulate theoretically
the degree of mobility stemming from each of the consumption models examined.
We then compare them statistically with the actual amount of mobility estimated
in the data. The results reject statistically each of the simple representations of
the consumption decision rule, and reveal that households smooth income shocks
to a lesser extent than implied by the PIH. A noteworthy feature of our method is
that the estimates are robust to the presence of measurement error in consumption
and taste shocks, although we cannot identify the separate contribution of these
two components on consumption dynamics.
Several criteria suggest that our estimates describe the dynamics of the con-
sumption distribution remarkably well. First, the estimates are able to match
the empirical transition matrix cell by cell. Second, the results are robust with
respect to different definitions of consumption (in per capita or per adult equiv-
alent terms), to the presence of measurement error in income, taste shocks, and
to various other sensitivity checks on sample exclusions and definitions. Third,
the results do not change when we estimate income and consumption mobility
simultaneously, instead of relying on a two-step procedure. Finally, and most
important, the group-specific estimates by education match the different patterns
of consumption mobility we find in the data.
There are three important by-products of our analysis. First, we produce
estimates of the sensitivity of consumption to permanent and transitory income
shocks that are potentially useful to evaluate fiscal policy experiments that affect
the timing of income receipts and, more generally, households’ budget constraints.
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In this respect, we find considerable asymmetric response to transitory income
shocks by education groups: a low response in the group with higher education
and a relatively high response for households with lower education.
Second, we provide a powerful test of the consumption insurance model. So
far these tests have focused on mean and variance restrictions of the distribu-
tion of consumption growth. Mean restrictions require consumption growth to
be orthogonal, on average, to idiosyncratic income shocks. If shocks are mea-
sured with error, however, these tests are biased towards the null hypothesis of
full consumption insurance. Variance restrictions require the cross-sectional vari-
ance of consumption growth to be constant over time. But the variance might
be stationary even if the underlying consumption distribution is shifting. Thus,
variance restriction tests too are biased towards the null. Our test is free from
these problems, because we look at the entire consumption distribution, not just
its mean or variance. On the other hand, the implementation of this test and, more
generally, the evaluation of consumption mobility requires genuine panel data
and suitable assumptions about the distribution of measurement error and taste
shocks, while mean and variance restriction tests can be performed with repeated
cross-sectional data.
Finally, the estimates could be used to single out the separate contributions
of incomplete markets, excess sensitivity, measurement error, and taste shocks in
generating the short and long run consumption mobility we observe in the panel
data. One important question is to what extent the failure of complete markets is
due to the unwillingness of society to forgo social mobility, an issue that we plan
to explore in future research.
Appendix A: The Simulated Minimum χ2 Estimator
Let P(θ ) represent the q × q transition matrix with typical element pij (θ), where
θ is a vector of k unknown parameters:
P(θ) =

p11(θ) p12(θ) . . . p1q(θ)
p21(θ) p22(θ) . . . p2q(θ)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
pq1(θ) pq2(θ) . . . pqq(θ)
 .
Conformably with P(θ) let Pˆ represent the q × q empirical transition matrix
with typical element pˆij :
Pˆ =

pˆ11 pˆ12 . . . pˆ1q
pˆ21 pˆ22 . . . pˆ2q
. . . . . . . . . . . .
pˆq1 pˆq2 . . . pˆqq
 .
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The transition matrices P(θ) and Pˆ are subject to the restrictions∑q
j=1 pij (θ) = 1 and
∑q
j=1 pˆij = 1 (i = 1 . . . q), respectively. This creates
a singularity problem similar to the one in the estimation of a full demand sys-
tem. To avoid this problem, we drop one column (say, the qth column) from both
P(θ) and Pˆ.
Let p(θ) represent the q(q − 1) × 1 vector of true transition probabilities
and conformably with p(θ) let pˆ represent the q(q − 1) × 1 vector of estimated
transition probabilities. The distance between the empirical and true transition
probabilities is d (θ) = pˆ−p(θ), whose covariance matrix (θ) is block diagonal
with generic block31
i(θ) =

pi1(θ)(1−pi1(θ))
ni
−pi1(θ)pi2(θ)
ni
. . . −pi1(θ)piq−1(θ)
ni
pi2(θ)(1−pi2(θ))
ni
. . . −pi2(θ)piq−1(θ)
ni
. . . . . .
piq−1(θ)(1−piq−1(θ))
ni

for i = 1 . . . q (we assume ni = n/q is an integer for simplicity), so that
(θ) =

1(θ) 0 . . . 0
2(θ) . . . 0
. . . . . .
q(θ)
 .
From Chamberlain (1984), the minimum χ2 method solves the problem
min
θ
d(θ)′Wd(θ),
where W is a weighting matrix. Call θˆ the minimumχ2 estimate of θ . Chamberlain
(1984) and others show that θˆ is consistent, asymptotically normal with covariance
matrix
var
(
θˆ
) = (G(θˆ)′WG(θˆ))−1 G(θˆ)′W(θ)WG(θˆ) (G(θˆ)′WG(θˆ))−1 ,
where G(θˆ) = ∂d(θˆ)/∂θ ′ is the gradient matrix. It is a well-known result that the
optimal weighting matrix (in the efficiency sense) is (θ)−1. In this case,
var
(
θˆ
) = (G(θˆ)′(θ)−1G(θˆ))−1 .
In our case p(θ) has no closed form, so we replace it with an approximation
based on simulations, as in the simulated method of moments (McFadden 1989;
Duffie and Singleton 1991). Recall that the generic pij (θ) is
pij (θ) = Pr(ln c∗h,t ∈ i| ln c∗h,t−2 ∈ j, θ),
31. We neglect the extra randomness induced by the fact that the class boundaries are preestimated.
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for example, the probability of making a transition to class i from class j condi-
tioning on being in class j. The transition law for consumption is determined by
(15), reproduced here:
ln c∗h,t = ln c∗h,t−2 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t +
(1 − λ)r
1 + r εh,t−1 − λεh,t−2 + ζh,t + ζh,t−1
)
+ α(υh,t − υh,t−2),
where in our case θ = (ϕ α λ)′.32 For simulation purposes, we assume εh,r ∼
N
(
0, σ 2ε
)
, ζh,τ ∼ N
(
0, σ 2ζ
)
, and υh,τ ∼ N
(
0, σ 2ln c∗h,τ
)
for all τ .
By construction, the normality of the income shocks and of measurement
error generates a symmetric transition matrix for consumption. This feature of the
simulations is consistent with the symmetry of the empirical matrix documented
in Table 2. Our results do not depend on the normality assumption. We choose
normality for simplicity, but note that any symmetric distribution would work as
well, because it would imply a symmetric transition matrix.
Define uh = (εh,t εh,t−1 εh,t−2 ζh,t ζh,t−1 υh,t υh,t−2)′ the vector of distur-
bances. For each household h, we draw S independent realizations of uh, and
store the HS realizations (H being the number of households).33 It is necessary
to keep these basic drawings of ush fixed when θ changes, in order to have good
numerical and statistical properties of the estimators based on the simulations.
Conditioning on the measured (not simulated) ln c∗h,t−2, the simulated ush,
and a choice for θ , one obtains
ln c∗sh,t = ln c∗h,t−2 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r ε
s
h,t +
(1 − λ)r
1 + r ε
s
h,t−1 − λεsh,t−2 + ζ sh,t + ζ sh,t−1
)
+ α(υ˜sh,t − υ˜sh,t−2), (A.1)
This allows computation of psij (θ). One can then define p¯ij (θ) = S−1
∑S
s=1
psij (θ) as the approximation of pij (θ) obtained by means of simulations.
Call the simulated distance d¯(θ) = pˆ−p¯(θ) where p¯(θ) is the vector of simu-
lated transition probabilities with generic element p¯ij (θ). Note that the covariance
matrix of d¯(θ), ¯(θ)a.s.→(1 + S−1) (θ) where (1 + S−1) is an inflating factor of
the variance of the true distance vector induced by the additional randomness of
the simulations. With a large enough number of simulations, however, this factor
plays little weight in practice.
The choice of θ minimizes the simulated minimum χ2 criterion
min
θ
d¯(θ)′¯(θ)−1d¯(θ).
32. We neglect the problems associated with the fact that r is given, and that σ 2ln c∗
h,t−2
, σ 2ln c∗
h,t
, σ 2ε ,
and σ 2ζ are preestimated.
33. In each year we choose a sample size identical to the number of actual sample transitions (for
instance, it is 2,982 in 1991–1993 and 3,211 in 1993–1995).
“zwu001060309” — 2006/1/24 — page 110 — #36
110 Journal of the European Economic Association
Call θ˜ the resulting solution. Then, the results in Lee and Ingram (1991),
McFadden (1989), and Duffie and Singleton (1993) imply that θ˜ is consistent,
asymptotically normal with covariance matrix
var(θ˜) =
(
1 + 1
S
)[
G(θ˜)′ (θ˜)−1 G(θ˜)
]−1
.
Goodness of fit can be assessed using
m = d(θ˜)′ (θ˜)−1 d(θ˜) ∼ χ2q(q−1)−k.
Note that when q(q − 1) > k as in our empirical application, this goodness-of-
fit statistic can be interpreteted as an overidentifying restriction statistics. This is
because we estimate k parameters but minimize the distance between q(q−1) > k
actual and theoretical transition probabilities.
The algorithm that we implement is thus the following:
1. Draw ush (h = 1 . . . H, s = 1 . . . S).
2. Choose a starting value for θ , say θ0.
3. Compute ln c∗h,t using (A1), p¯ij (θ0), and d¯ij (θ0) = pˆij − p¯ij (θ0) (i = 1 . . . q,
j = 1 . . . q − 1).
4. Compute d¯(θ0)′ ¯(θ0)−1d¯(θ0).
5. Update the value of θ .
6. Repeat steps 3–5 until a prespecified convergence criterion is met. Eventually
this provides the required simulated minimum χ2 estimate θ˜ of θ .
We update the value of θ using the simulated annealing method of Goffe,
Ferrier, and Rogers (1994).34 This is a derivative-free minimization method that
escapes local minima. Starting from an initial value, the algorithm takes a step
and evaluates the function. Downhill steps are always accepted, whereas uphill
steps are accepted probabilistically according to the Metropolis criterion. As the
algorithm proceeds, the length of the step declines until the χ2 reaches the global
minimum.
Appendix B: Test Equivalence
Here we prove the statement in Section 2 that the χ2 goodness-of-fit criterion (2)
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
ni
(
pˆij − pij (θ)
)2
pij (θ)
(A.2)
is equivalent to (pˆ − p(θ)) (θ)−1(pˆ − p(θ))′.
34. We use the Gauss code on simulated annealing written by E.G. Tsionas and available at
〈http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/cas/econ/gaussres/optimize/optimize.htm〉.
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Note first that (A2) is the sum of q independent χ2 distributions of the form
mi = ∑qj=1 nip−1ij (pˆij − pij (θ))2. The sum of q independent χ2 distributions
is also a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the sum of the degrees
of freedom of the χ2 distributions that are summed.
Notice that the theoretical and empirical transition probabilities are subject to
the restrictions
∑q
j=1 pij (θ) = 1 and
∑q
j=1 pˆij = 1(i = 1 . . . q), respectively.
Thus mi = ∑qj=1 nipij (θ)−1(pˆij − pij (θ))2 can be rewritten as
mi =
q−1∑
j=1
ni
pij (θ)
(pˆij − pij (θ))2+ ni
piq(θ)
q−1∑
j=1
(
pˆij − pij (θ)
)2
=
q−1∑
j=1
ni
pij (θ)
(
pˆij − pij (θ)
)2+ ni
piq(θ)
q−1∑
j=1
(pˆij − pij (θ))
q−1∑
j=1
(pˆij − pij (θ)),
or, more compactly
mi = di (θ)′Ai (θ) di (θ) + di (θ)′Bi (θ) di (θ)
= di (θ)′i(θ) di (θ),
where di (θ) = pˆi − pi (θ) is the distance between empirical and true transition
probabilities in row i of the transition matrix (excluding the qth column), and
i(θ) = Ai (θ) + Bi (θ), with
Ai (θ) =

ni
p11(θ)
0 . . . 0
0 ni
p12(θ)
. . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . ni
p1q−1(θ)

and Bi (θ) = (ni/piq(θ)) ii′, where i is a (q −1)×1 vector of ones, so that Bi (θ)
is a matrix that contains (ni/piq(θ)) everywhere. It’s easy to prove that i(θ) =
i(θ)
−1 defined in Appendix B. Because asymptotically di (θ) ∼ N(0, i(θ)),
it follows that
mi =
q∑
j=1
ni
(pˆij − pij (θ))2
pij (θ)
= di (θ)′i(θ)−1di (θ)
is distributed χ2 with (q − 1) degrees of freedom. Moreover
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
ni
(pˆij − pij (θ))2
pij (θ)
=
q∑
i=1
mi =
q∑
i=1
di (θ)′i(θ)−1di (θ)
= d(θ)′(θ)−1d(θ)
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is distributedχ2 with q(q−1) degrees of freedom. This is exactly the function that
we minimize in the simulated minimum χ2 application. This proves the equiva-
lence between
∑q
i=1
∑q
j=1 nipij (θ)−1(pˆij − pij (θ))2 and d(θ)′(θ)−1d(θ).
An alternative to the minimum χ2 criterion
∑q
i=1
∑q
j=1 nipij (θ)−1
(pˆij − pij (θ))2 is to use the modified minimum χ2 criterion∑qi=1∑qj=1 nipˆ−1ij
(pˆij − pij (θ))2. Following the same steps above, one can show that
q∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
ni
(pˆij − pij (θ))2
pˆij
= d(θ)′ˆ−1d(θ),
where ˆ is a block-diagonal matrix with generic block
ˆi =

pˆi1(1−pˆi1)
ni
− pˆi1pˆi2
ni
. . . − pˆi1pˆiq−1
ni
pˆi2(1−pˆi2)
ni
. . . − pˆi2pˆiq−1
ni
. . . . . .
pˆiq−1(1−pˆiq−1)
ni
 .
Because pˆij is a consistent estimate of pij (θ), ˆ →a.s. (θ). In the estima-
tion, we use the modified simulated minimum χ2 criterion, that is, use ˆ (based
on the empirical transition probabilities) as an estimate of (θ).
Appendix C: The Simulated Minimum χ2 Estimator
in the Extended Case
Let Px(θ) be a q × q transition matrix for variable x with typical element pxij (θ);
Pˆx is its empirical analog with typical element Pˆ xij . Let p
x(θ) be the stacked
q(q−1)×1 vector of true transition probabilities obtained after dropping the qth
column of the transition matrix Px(θ) to avoid singularity; and pˆx its empirical
analog.
Define
p(θ) =
pc(θ)py(θ)
R(θ)
 and pˆ =
pˆ
c
pˆy
Rˆ
 ,
where superscripts c and y refer to (log) consumption and income, respectively,
R(θ) is the Spearman joint rank correlation of true consumption and income
growth, and Rˆ its empirical analog.
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The distance between empirical and true statistics is d(θ) = pˆ−p(θ), whose
covariance matrix (θ) we assume to be block-diagonal35
(θ) =

c(θ) 0 0
y(θ) 0
ω(θ)
 ,
with ω(θ) = (1 − R(θ)2)/(n − 2),
x(θ) =

x1(θ) 0 . . . 0
x2(θ) . . . 0
. . . . . .
xq(θ)
 ,
and
xi (θ) =

pxi1(θ)
(
1−pxi1(θ)
)
ni
−pxi1(θ)pxi2(θ)
ni
. . . −p
x
i1(θ)p
x
iq−1(θ)
ni
pxi2(θ)
(
1−pxi2(θ)
)
ni
. . . −p
x
i2(θ)p
x
iq−1(θ)
ni
. . . . . .
pxiq−1(θ)
(
1−pxiq−1(θ)
)
ni

for i = 1 . . . q (we assume ni = n/q is an integer for simplicity).
The estimation strategy now proceeds as explained in Appendix A. The only
crucial difference is that we simulate both consumption growth and (residual)
income growth using the transition laws
ln c∗h,t = ln c∗h,t−2 + φ
(
λ + r
1 + r εh,t +
(1 − λ)r
1 + r εh,t−1 − λεh,t−2 + ζh,t + ζh,t−1
)
+ α(υh,t − υh,t−2)
and
ln yh,t = ln yh,t−2 + (dt − dt−2) + β(Xh,t − Xh,t−2)
+ ζh,t + ζh,t−1 + εh,t − εh,t−2.
35. We neglect the extra randomness induced by the fact that the class boundaries are preesti-
mated. We also ignore correlation between consumption transition probabilities and income transition
probabilities.
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